First Element
Regarding the first element of malicious prosecution — whether each defendant can be deemed to have brought about the proceedings, i.e. was a ‘prosecutor’ — the court emphasised the necessity of both the active role of the defendants and the inability of the prosecuting authority to independently obtain knowledge about the information forming the basis of the proceedings.
In this case, the court found that the first defendant satisfied the requirements for being a prosecutor of the proceedings for the charges against the plaintiff of common assault and stalking and intimidation with the intent to cause fear of physical harm. For both charges, Cavanagh J found that the plaintiff’s former wife had instigated the actions of the prosecuting authority by giving a statement. In addition, insofar as the information in the statement was solely within the defendant’s knowledge (they related to events that occurred in a private environment with only the defendant’s sister-in-law as a witness), the defendant further cemented her role as an active procurer of the bringing of these charges.
The court further concluded that the second defendant qualified as a prosecutor. The former wife’s brother had similarly activated the bringing of charges that excluded the possibility of independent investigation — he too had submitted a statement and adduced only a witness as a means of corroborating his information.
In relation to the first defendant’s charges against the plaintiff for threatening text messages, however, Cavanagh J found that the first defendant did not count as a prosecutor. Since police would have been able to verify independently the sending and receipt of those messages, the first defendant did not play the key instigating role in the bringing of charges within the meaning of the tort.
Second Element
That the criminal proceedings had terminated in the plaintiff’s favour was not in dispute.
Third and Fourth Elements
In considering whether the plaintiff’s claim satisfied the third and fourth elements of the crime, the court focused on whether the defendants had intentionally provided a false statement to police; sufficient proof that the defendants provided evidence leading to an unfounded criminal charge would establish both the defendants’ malice and the groundlessness of the charges against the plaintiff.
Cavanagh J ultimately found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that either of the defendants had consciously concocted information when providing the statements that led to the charges against the plaintiff.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court queried the plaintiff’s account of events and construction of the defendants’ subjective states that he claimed implicated the accuseds’ enactment of, and intention to enact, malicious prosecution of the plaintiff. The plaintiff maintained in particular that his former spouse had been plotting from his first days in Australia to end her marriage to the plaintiff by removing him from the country through having him falsely convicted on criminal charges.
The court considered several perceived implausibilities of this account, including the fact that the plaintiff at one point obtained protective orders against the second defendant on the basis of reported information about his dispute with his former spouse which the plaintiff apparently knew to be false, and the fact that the defendants did not resort to less extreme means of having the plaintiff deported before availing themselves of criminal means to do so.
On the whole, the “high bar” set by the plaintiff’s apparently very charged construction of the first defendant’s intentions, in addition to various details in the plaintiff’s story that the court found dubious, prevented the plaintiff from convincing the court to a requisite degree that the plaintiff’s version of events was true.
The court was careful to note, however, that its determination that the plaintiff’s version of events was likely untrue did not amount to confirmation that the defendants’ versions of events were correct.